08.15.2019

CCP12 Responds To Default Management Consultation

08.15.2019

The Global Association of Central Counterparties (“CCP12”) published its response to the discussion paper entitled “Central Counterparty Default Management Auctions” issued by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“CPMI-IOSCO”).

CCP12 welcomes the opportunity to respond to this discussion paper, as we believe that the default management process, which is not limited to auctions, is one of the most important processes within a CCPs business. We have therefore also highlighted this topic in our recently published paper “CCP Best Practices – a CCP12 Position Paper”. CCP12 responds to the different aspects consulted by CPMI-IOSCO: roles and responsibilities, considerations for a successful auction, operational considerations, client participation and default of a common participant across multiple CCPs.

“Due to cleared product types, market structures and characteristics, regulatory and legal environments in different jurisdictions, operational requirements, and other factors, a “one-size-fits all” auction approach to CCPs is not possible and it is critical to recognize that differences exist. Furthermore, it is also imperative that CCP’s retain flexibility in their default management approach to react to the facts and circumstances at the time of the event,” said Mr. Xu Zhen, Chairman of CCP12.

Mr. Marcus Zickwolff, CEO of CCP12 added: “CCP12 fully supports transparency about the default management process, which will enable auction participants to be prepared to participate during a default and to bring the CCP back to a matched book.”

Source: CCP12

Response from WFE:

The World Federation of Exchanges (“WFE”), the global industry group for exchanges and CCPs, has responded to the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) & International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) discussion paper on central counterparty default management auctions.

The purpose of the discussion paper is to facilitate the sharing of existing practices on default management auctions, and to foster dialogue on the key concepts, processes and operational aspects used by CCPs in planning and executing default management auctions.

The CPMI-IOSCO paper sets a baseline of best practices, while recognising the importance of giving CCPs the ability to adapt practices to address the specific circumstances of a particular default. This is welcome, and a fitting complement to the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. Importantly, CPMI-IOSCO have acknowledged the importance of taking into account the product that is being cleared and the local (or, in many cases, cross-border) market.

The WFE response can be summarised as follows:

  • It is of crucial importance that default management auctions preserve an incentive structure which promotes CCP recovery over resolution, ensuring that all participants fully play their appropriate role in line with the interests of financial stability The WFE recommends that any guidance on default management auctions should not only be directed to CCPs, but also to the clearing members, and potentially clients, as their participation will effectively determine the success or failure of the auction.
  • The WFE believes that proposals around compensation following recovery/resolution, and/or overly large CCP skin-in-game contributions could reduce the likelihood of a successful auction outcome, and should be avoided.
  • Addressing cross-CCP shocks such as clearing member or participant defaults is complicated, not least because CCPs operate worldwide from different time zones and are subject to local regulatory and bankruptcy regimes. This makes deference to home regulatory considerations essential with respect to cross-border supervisory planning and co-operation.
  • The board of the CCP cannot and should not abdicate accountability for the success or failure of default management, even when outsourcing some aspects to external parties, including clearing members. It is inappropriate for external parties (other than regulators) to have overriding decision-making powers concerning the conduct of default management processes.
  • The principle of independence is fundamental to a CCP being able to effectively manage stress events, and should not be impaired by the commercial interests of its clearing members.

Nandini Sukumar, Chief Executive Officer, WFE said: “The WFE is supportive of this paper, which aims to promote best practice by summarising relevant considerations. This is important, not least because the close collaboration between a CCP and its primary regulator should not be complicated by overly proscriptive default management auction frameworks at the international level. As the global body for CCPs, we recognise that deference to local regulation is essential to the successful functioning of default management processes.”

Source: WFE

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